Is Hamas slowly losing its appeal?
A collection of reports from various TV networks, with interesting Gaza footage and interviews.
Actual video footage from the Gaza Strip is usually hard to come by; this collection of reports and interviews offer a first-hand account of current affairs. Together with the recent poll among Palestinians both in the Strip and in the West Bank, some evaluations can be made.
Hamas’ hold in the Strip is still dominant and there are no antagonists that appear to be able to challenge it. Fatah is focused on the West Bank, other Islamic groups in the Strip are too small and militarily weak.
Hamas’ popularity however is slowly waning. This is due to two main reasons: one, people in the strip are seeing no end to the blockade and see Hamas’ hard-line stance as unproductive after 3 years of blockade. Second, they see the slow but constant rise of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank. Abbas may be considered weak, but Prime Minister Fayyad is generally appreciated and is the mind behind the recent Palestinian economic surge. While results are still far from satisfactory, the West Bank has started to move towards a real economic growth that is still a mirage in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Israeli and Arab crackdown on Hamas resources abroad has probably weakened its source of revenue and foreign support might have dwindled as well: this forced the movement to levy taxes on the Strip population, something that is lowering popular support even more. Palestinians might heavily dislike (or even hate) Israel, but a state of constant war doesn’t appear to be what they desire. And a state of constant war is what Hamas is promoting in the end. ANP instead has shown an unstable peace can still bring at least some benefits.
Going back to the situation inside the Strip, it looks like the Palestinian people there, despite usual claims to the contrary, isn’t starving: local supermarkets are full with products (even non-vital ones like cigarettes or chupa-chups…). However, the majority comes from smuggling through tunnels. Therefore on one hand closing tunnels is essential to avoid the smuggling of weapon, on the other hand until now it would have major effects on food availability. The recent decision by Israel to allow safe passage to food and non-military equipment through traditional crossings might allow the IDF and Egypt to strike even harder at tunnels with less restrain, but the local economy is so dependant from the tunnels that, right now, it would be crippled anyway but such actions.
International pressure often brings up the question: for how long can Israel go on with this situation? However, the accompanying question has to be: for how long can Hamas go on with this situation? Actually, we can reasonably assume Hamas can still go on for a long time. Unrest is unlikely to rise to dangerous levels in a short time span, and the economy is already used to survive on a razor’s edge. However disaffection is growing and Fatah’s popularity is rising. One interesting point to consider is the opinion about future elections. According to the poll Fatah would be the winner, but many people would like both West Bank and Gaza to vote. Assuming this happened, would Hamas accept the result? Hardly, as it would legitimize its own political failure and the Islamic movement would have to forfeit sovereignty of the Strip.
Hamas is therefore in a curious situation, where it seeks global recognition but also needs to remain isolated to avoid being swallowed up by Fatah popularity. The only acceptable way for Hamas to reunite Gaza with the West Bank wuld be at its own terms, with total dominance; but in the West Bank the movement is becoming a more and more irrelevant. And this might spread to Gaza too: if Fayyad really follows the path of a Palestinian State self-declaration, and the new nation becomes recognized worldwide, what pull would Hamas have to continue keeping Gaza outside of it except for a tenuous military hold? Even a Palestinian Intifada against Hamas could be a possible scenario. But it’s still too early for such hypotheses.
