Here’s my first article, dealing with increasing Israeli-Greek cooperation in the military field, now that Ankara looks more distant than ever from Jerusalem:

Israel turns to Greece as rift with Turkey continues.

Sorry for a few typos that somehow escaped be despite having re-read the article several times. Like IAD instead of IAF near the end.

Actual video footage from the Gaza Strip is usually hard to come by; this collection of reports and interviews offer a first-hand account of current affairs. Together with the recent poll among Palestinians both in the Strip and in the West Bank, some evaluations can be made.

Hamas’ hold in the Strip is still dominant and there are no antagonists that appear to be able to challenge it. Fatah is focused on the West Bank, other Islamic groups in the Strip are too small and militarily weak.

Hamas’ popularity however is slowly waning. This is due to two main reasons: one, people in the strip are seeing no end to the blockade and see Hamas’ hard-line stance as unproductive after 3 years of blockade. Second, they see the slow but constant rise of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank. Abbas may be considered weak, but Prime Minister Fayyad is generally appreciated and is the mind behind the recent Palestinian economic surge. While results are still far from satisfactory, the West Bank has started to move towards a real economic growth that is still a mirage in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Israeli and Arab crackdown on Hamas resources abroad has probably weakened its source of revenue and foreign support might have dwindled as well: this forced the movement to levy taxes on the Strip population, something that is lowering popular support even more. Palestinians might heavily dislike (or even hate) Israel, but a state of constant war doesn’t appear to be what they desire. And a state of constant war is what Hamas is promoting in the end. ANP instead has shown an unstable peace can still bring at least some benefits.

Going back to the situation inside the Strip, it looks like the Palestinian people there, despite usual claims to the contrary, isn’t starving: local supermarkets are full with products (even non-vital ones like cigarettes or chupa-chups…). However, the majority comes from smuggling through tunnels. Therefore on one hand closing tunnels is essential to avoid the smuggling of weapon, on the other hand until now it would have major effects on food availability. The recent decision by Israel to allow safe passage to food and non-military equipment through traditional crossings might allow the IDF and Egypt to strike even harder at tunnels with less restrain, but the local economy is so dependant from the tunnels that, right now, it would be crippled anyway but such actions.

International pressure often brings up the question: for how long can Israel go on with this situation? However, the accompanying question has to be: for how long can Hamas go on with this situation? Actually, we can reasonably assume Hamas can still go on for a long time. Unrest is unlikely to rise to dangerous levels in a short time span, and the economy is already used to survive on a razor’s edge. However disaffection is growing and Fatah’s popularity is rising. One interesting point to consider is the opinion about future elections. According to the poll Fatah would be the winner, but many people would like both West Bank and Gaza to vote. Assuming this happened, would Hamas accept the result? Hardly, as it would legitimize its own political failure and the Islamic movement would have to forfeit sovereignty of the Strip.

Hamas is therefore in a curious situation, where it seeks global recognition but also needs to remain isolated to avoid being swallowed up by Fatah popularity. The only acceptable way for Hamas to reunite Gaza with the West Bank wuld be at its own terms, with total dominance; but in the West Bank the movement  is becoming a more and more irrelevant. And this might spread to Gaza too: if Fayyad really follows the path of a Palestinian State self-declaration, and the new nation becomes recognized worldwide, what pull would Hamas have to continue keeping Gaza outside of it except for a tenuous military hold?  Even a Palestinian Intifada against Hamas could be a possible scenario. But  it’s still too early for such hypotheses.

First of all, in brief:

Tactical -> battles
Operational -> campaigns
Strategic -> wars

Now a few classic definitions from land warfare doctrine:
The tactical level applies where the ranges of individual weapon systems are significant. Not so much the range of small arms, but more the range of artillery. The tactical level is usually considered to be concerned with units below the size of a division. This level deals with fighting individual battles. Grand Tactical is the sub-level dealing with the battle, the pure tactical term is usually used to small-unit actions. Skirmish deals with man-to-man.

The operational level deals with divisions, corps and armies (sometimes separate brigade-sized formations such as an armored cavalry regiment, too). Maneuver is on a scale where weapons ranges are not really significant any more. The operational level deals with carrying out operations (like military campaigns) and attaining objectives that support strategic goals.

The strategic level deals with national levels resources and objectives. This is where elements such as economic power and diplomatic power really must be considered as much as military power.

Iran is therefore forced to refit its existing assets, but the Mersad – which fires the Shahin missile, a modified HAWK – is hardly a valuable solution in dealing with modern air forces.

You can find my full analysis on this topic on Equilibri.net (in Italian):

Iran: perspectives on the anti-aircract defence system

Lo Stretto di Hormuz al centro della partita tra Iran e Occidente

(The Straits of Hormuz in the middle of the Iran-West face-off)

In 2004 a simulation showed the 5th Fleet’s inability to deal with a swarm of fast-attack boats like the one fielded by the IRGCN. The Pentagon should have found a solution to those issues, or keeping the Straits open will be a tough proposition even if Western economies can withstand a few days of oil shortage due to the use of national strategic reserves to keep oil price from rising too much.

His predecessor Dan Halutz had been fired in 2006 after the Second Lebanon War, during which the IDF had shown an inadequacy and disorganization that had led to excessive casualties and marginal results. Ashkenazi instead had brought the armed forces to a superior level of morale and effectiveness thanks to rigorous training, the firing of those officer he deemed as inefficient, and through a work-first, speak-later ethic.

This whole program allowed the IDF to regain its past edge as showed during Operation Cast Lead. On the other hand however his severity and low-profile didn’t endeavor him to the media or that part of the establishment that didn’t like his stubbornness. It appears likely a difference of views on several strategic issues – coupled with a refusal to back down or find a mediation – is at the basis of Barak’s decision; a significant example is the opposite evaluation of the most probable successor to the Kyria: Maj.General Yoav Gallant, GOC of Southern Command. The latter has lead Cast Lead (maybe he planned it too) and is appreciated by Barak due to his more aggressive stance. Haaretz instead reports that Ashkenazi vetoed his nomination.

It has to be said that the current situation doesn’t justify a change of personnel: now that the Iranian menace is seen as closer than ever and the Gaza situation remains critical, continuity and stability of command should be a priority. And it is usually seen as such, as shown by the recent extension of Meir Dagan’s term at the head of Mossad.

This entire affair can’t be simply dismissed as just a case of internal backstabbing: the influence a Chief of Staff has on national security means major repercussions could be felt. First of all, the efficiency of the Israeli chain of command is at risk. Ashkenazi will leave in 2011 but before the end of summer the new Divisional commanders will be appointed; the involved officers – as well as those involved in Ashkenazi’s succession – might prefer to play the political game first instead of devolving their attention to their usual duties only.

Secondarily Ashkenazi’s own authority could be undermined as a result. Will his subordinates obey at once in delicate issues if they feel he is already politically dead? The whole military system could suffer if called into action (in Gaza, Lebanon or Iran) and it could be plagued by command paralysis.

Thirdly, the next Chief of Staff – if coming from a field command – is likely to keep his attention mainly focused on his previous operational theater. Therefore Gallant might look to keep major pressure against Hamas in Gaza (even if not necessarily through extreme measures); Gadi Eisenkot (GOC Northern Command) might advise to be prudent in the south so as to not weaken Israeli positions near Lebanon against Hezbollah; Avi Mizrahi (previous GOC Central Command) could be influenced by his experience in dealing with West Bank problematics to the point of seeing it as the main issue. While the political government usually guides the Chief of Staff’s moves, he is still a powerful voice.

Ashkenazi’s successor will surely benefit from the current Chief of Staff’s good job, but he will also have to care about relationships with Barak, who is likely to remain heavily involved even in purely military decisions. The future Chief of IDF will need to have the Minister’s strategic vision: from measures to employ against Hamas in Gaza to Hezbollah’s containment in the north, from relationship with the PA in the west Bank to the most important issue: an eventual military action against Iran. Knowing the next Chief of Staff might help understanding at least part of the approach Israel will try to follow.

This isn’t a permanent truce, and it’s not seen as such by all contendants. Border incidents, maybe caused by minor groups that do not bow to Hamas’ requests, can escalate tensions once again.  But it is a sign of four factors

1) the influence some outside parties still have in local affairs is huge. Russia and Syria probably can do more to stop Hamas than any Israeli military operation.

2) Hamas can control the launch of rockets from the Strip to Isreal if it wants, despite claims to the contrary. It can force its authority over more than just the Ezzedin Al-Qassam Brigades. Even assuming some rogue elements exist (and they probably exist), they can be tracked down and destroyed and the truce maintained, if Hamas is really interested in preserving it.

3) Israel has to understand isolating Hamas on the diplomatic front (through talks with Syria about the Golan, and with Russia) is one of the best strategies in dealing effectively with the Gaza situation. Power is exercised not only through firepower, but also through smart diplomacy.

4) Hamas needs outside support and can’t live alone. It never has, depending on outside sources for weapons, money and equipment. The Egyptian barrier wall, in addition to Russia’s and Syria’s waning support, is a serious threat to Hamas’ hold in the Strip. Meshal states that Hamas is ready to fight against Israel again, but Haniye and the leadership in the Strip know otherwise. The movement has to find another way to fight its political battle.

First of all the importance of a few acts is not to be evaluated against the act itself, but on the message it was meant to convey. the formal annexion of the Jewish Holy Sites (like the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron) doesn’t change the status quo already existing in those places. Like Chaim Yavin’s “Land of the Settlers” reportage of a few years ago showed, those places are already surrounded by colonists who, in turn, are protected by Israeli troops. Palestinians already have problems getting there.  It didn’t bring a new situation on the ground, but, like the approval of the new contructions in the East Jerusalem neighborhood, it was meant to convey a message: we won’t stand idly while the outside world forces its views on us. We will force everything to pass under difficult – maybe impossible – bargaining.

The Israeli statements, the US’ replies, the Quartet’s position on the creation of a Palestinian State inside two years, Netanyahu’s replies about the possible stop of all negotiation and the statement that Jerusalem “is not a colony” and Ban Ki-Moon’s statements from Gaza all show that all parties appear to have fallen into the trap of shouting diplomacy.

Negotiations usually work best when all sides can keep a low profile as this cancels the need for strong public statements: this makes it easier to talk about problematic issues. When instead a high profile and public declarations are made, people’s feelings and country pride become aroused: the result is usually the need from spokespersons to take hard stances and close most opportunities for dialogue. It is a downward spiral where all sides have to react in harsher terms in order not to lose face, especially in the eyes of their own people.

This is what is happening now. Washington’s positions have been seen by Jerusalem not just as an expression of grief over the recent events, but actually as a direct challenge the Israeli ultra-right and their positions. The latter in turn has felt compelled to reply in kind to show it wouldn’t fold easily.

At the same time Washington, the UN and the Quartet can’t show weakness either, because they have committed themselves strongly in this and would risk losing face in front of the Arab world, as it would look like a surrender to Israel’s terms. All recent gains in the region – Fatah’s turn towards peaceful resistance, the failure of Hamas’ “Day of Rage” which caused only minor unrest and has already been quelled, the Arab countries’ support to indirect talks – would be jeopardized and radical extremism would gain strength.

What is needed to go back to normal relationships? Actually it is not possible to just go back and cancel what has happened. Therefore it is unlikely cooler heads will prevail soon: at least a few more weeks (maybe months) of heated debates are to be expected. The main issue is the composition of the Israeli government. The US would like to substitute Avigdor Lieberman of Yisrael Beitenu and Eli Yishai of Shas with Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni and their parties. A Netanyahu-led coalition of Likud, Labor and Kadima would have 68 MKs, a number that would have majority even if a few hard-line Likudniks walked away.

However as much as Netanyahu would love to keep good relationships with the US, he knows that – as Bradley Burston noted on Ha’aretz – it is much easier to clash with Barak Obama than with Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, spiritual head of Shas. What Israel fears most is a fratricide clash between colonists and ultra-orthodox Jews on one side – who are slowly becoming majority in the Jerusalem area – and the moderates on the other. A situation that would see even the IDF partially split because of Military Rabbis’ preachings.

This is probably why Netanyahu is allowing Israel to isolate itself: because currently the external world is less frightening than the internal one.

(This article first appeared in Italian in Il Caffé Geopolitico)

Good reading!

Come promesso, ho aggiunto una pagina chiamata “useful books” dove elenco libri che considero essere utili fonti sul conflitto Arabo-Israeliano, sulla situazione palestinese e sul Medio Oriente in generale. Viene fornita anche una breve recensione. La pagina è in inglese, ma i lettori italiani troveranno un link che porta alla stessa pagina tradotta in italiano!
La lista non è per nulla definitiva e ho in mente di aggiungere altri titoli appena possibile. Sentitevi liberi di indicarmi altri libri da aggiungere, tuttavia li citerò solo dopo averli letti, così da poter giudicare da me se siano effettivamente interessanti. Per questo motivo se mi suggerite un libro, siate pazienti mentre procedo a leggerlo prima di aggiungerlo!
Buona lettura!